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In this REVIEW some years ago, Edwin Elton and Martin Gruber (1970) used the concepts of market equilibrium and differential tax rates between capital gains and dividend income to structure a theoretical model which they then used empirically to estimate marginal stockholder tax rates. Their specification of an equilibrium condition is appropriate for a security seller who qualifies for preferential tax treatment of capital gains. However, their assumption that such a stockholder is the marginal stockholder in a market equilibrium is questionable. This assumption, along with disregard of transactions and other costs, is essential to their empirical derivation of stockholder tax rates. This note presents an alternative explanation of their empirical results.
The Elton and Gruber Model As specified by Elton and Gruber (E & G), a stockholder is indifferent to the timing of his sale of shares if his expected wealth is not affected by the transaction.
Indifference results when the net after-tax proceeds from the sale of shares before they go ex-dividend equals the combination of after-tax dividend and after-tax stock sale proceeds obtained by not selling the shares until the ex-dividend date. In this case, 
where PB = price on the day before the stock goes exdividend, PA = price of the stock on the ex-dividend day, PC = price at which the stock was purchased, tc = tax rate on capital gains, to = tax rate on ordinary (dividend) income, and D = amount of the dividend.
Rearranging (1) they obtain (PB-PA)/D = (1 -to)/(1 -tC)
from which the statistic (PB -PA)/D represents the ex-dividend pricing behavior which causes a stockholder with a particular set of tax rates tc and to to be indifferent to the timing of the sale of stock. Explicit in their model development and interpretation of the statistic (PB -PA)/D is the assumption that the marginal sellers of stock qualify for long-term capital gains tax treatment.
In a rational market the fall in price on the ex-dividend day should reflect the value of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains to the marginal stockholders. Since dividends and capital gains are taxable at different rates, the relative tax rate on these two types of income affect the decision.
(E & G, 1970, p. 69)
The assertion that capital gains and dividends of the marginal stockholder are taxed differentially is maintained in their empirical analysis to derive implied tax rates. For the period covered by their empirical study, they observe that t, is one half of to or 25%, whichever is lower. From this assumption and (PB -PA)/D statistics, they empirically derive implied tax rates of the marginal stockholder both for their entire sample and for various dividend yield classes arranged by deciles.
Model Extensions
Unless entry into the market equilibrating process is restricted, an assumption that the marginal stockholder has preferential long-term capital gains tax treatment may be unsound. The "equilibrium" implied by the assumed preferential tax treatment of capital gains permits possible increases in wealth for nonpreferentially taxed investors. In a pre-to postdividend-record-date-decision environment, long-term capital gains stockholders prefer a dollar of capital gains to a dollar of dividends because of the differential tax advantage of capital gains. Since investors lose a portion of their preferential long-term capital gains tax shield at the ex-dividend date, the statistic (PB -PA)/D is expected to be less than one if long-term capital gains sellers establish the market equilibrium since, in equation (2), t, < to.
Unlike long-term capital gains shareholders, ordinary income (short-term capital gains) and tax free shareholders do not lose preferential tax shields when making decisions to sell shares relative to the timing of the ex-dividend date. Ordinary income and tax free shareholders are possible marginal entrants since they may increase their wealth under pricing conditions which would otherwise result if only long-term capital gains shareholders entered the market equilibrating process. Two principal classes of potential sellers are now considered.1
Non-preferentially Taxed, Sunk-Cost Sellers
The ordinary income or tax free (short-or longterm) seller for whom PC is also a sunk cost is very similar to the long-term preferentially-taxed sunk-cost seller postulated for equation (2) (for whom t, < t,). The non-preferentially taxed seller, however, is one whose transaction either has no tax effects (t, = to = 0) or whose purchase of stock was not sufficiently remote in time to qualify for preferential capital gains tax treatment (t, = t,). In a perfect market, with entry of non-preferentially taxed sunk-cost stockholders, the expected equilibrium statistic is 
The Arbitrager
Another possible, and potentially very important, entrant into the equilibrating process is the arbitrager seeking to profit from buying at PB and selling at PA while also receiving D. For entry of a short-term arbi- trager, a (PB -PA) < D differential must be sufficient to cover "in and out" transactions costs and tax effects. If the equilibrium pricing behavior were as specified in equation (2) with t, < to, the short-term arbitrager potentially could obtain a gain, G, which must also cover his opportunity costs of investment. Since t, = to for a short-term buyer and seller, the required return for entry is
where tr is the effective rate of transactions cost relative to selling price per share. The cost may be viewed as that which applies to an economic order quantity, probably round lots, and may include both fixed and variable components. Equation ( Transactions costs, as noted previously, are likely to discourage entry of ordinary investors as arbitragers; but floor traders whose transactions costs are minimal may not be similarly discouraged unless their opportunity costs are high. Perhaps more importantly, nonpreferentially taxed sunk-cost sellers (including perhaps some large institutions) seem no more likely to be excluded by the above conditions than long-term capital gains sellers. Some of the above conditions might be influential in less than perfect markets, but probably no more so for non-preferentially taxed sellers than for long-term preferentially taxed sellers. The end result may be a mixture of long-and short-term entrants into the market equilibrating process.
Clientele Effects
In arranging their data by deciles according to dividend yields (D/P), E & G observed a generally increasing statistic (PB -PA)/D with increasing yields, which they interpreted as evidence of a tax "clientele effect." The higher the yield, the higher was the statistic, and the lower the implied tax bracket of the marginal stockholder, except for the two highest D/P deciles for which E & G reported indeterminate tax rates.
The increasing statistic perhaps partly reflects a clientele effect. However, if entry of non-preferentially taxed sellers occurs, an alternative explanation for the increasing statistic is available. From 
Conclusions
E & G created an inventive approach to estimating marginal stockholder tax rates. Unfortunately for those who desire a convenient procedure, their estimating procedure is of doubtful accuracy. We would have no reservations regarding use of their methodology for estimating tax rates if we were assured that marginal sellers of all shares in a sample of stocks going ex-dividend were long-term capital gains sellers. However, if some displacement of long-term capital gains sellers results, from entry of non-preferentially taxed sellers at the margin for some stocks, the accuracy of their procedure is questionable. Furthermore, if non-preferentially taxed holders were fully to displace long-term capital gains holders as sellers at the margin, no inferences of tax rates can be made, as may be seen in the equilibrium condition of equation (3).
A statistic (PB-PA)/D < 1 may reflect the influence of a floor trader with transactions and opportunity costs to be covered. If perchance the floor trader is the determining influence at the margin, again no inferences can be made regarding tax rates.
The relationships determining the pricing statistic are most likely more complex than postulated by E & G. Only if potential entrants other than long-term capital gains sellers are fully excluded, which seems unlikely, can accurate statements be made regarding marginal stockholder tax rates using E & G's methodology. Biased by the probable entry of others besides long-term capital gains sellers into the market equilibrating process, their approach at best may only partially capture the effects of tax rate differentials between ordinary and long-term capital gains income.
It follows that E & G's summary statements on the cost of retained earnings, stockholder tax-rate clientele effects, and market rationality of high tax bracket shareholders should be viewed with considerable caution. Additionally, caution should be exercised in using their methodology to estimate tax rates until more conclusive evidence is obtained. Reliable estimates of marginal tax rates might better be obtained by sampling and direct examination of stockholders' tax returns along with their stock purchase and sales activity. where ki is an investor's after-tax risk adjusted discount rate for period i, Pn is the expected share price at n, which is the investor's expected holding time horizon, FD is the after-tax present value of the dividend to time horizon n, and tc(n) is the investor's expected tax rate for period n. Equation ( If the market is restricted to long-term capital gains sellers and buyers, the ordinary income tax rate, to, and the capital gains rate, tc, can not be easily derived from the (PB -PA)/D statistic if, as can be persuasively argued, the long-term purchaser impacts on the equilibrium statistic. Even with simplifying assumptions of a constant required return, k, and tc(n) = .5to, we can not assume that tc = .5to for an intended long-term buyer. Because of the discounting effect, tc < .5tK except perhaps for very short holdings. However, very short holdings are likely to result in ordinary tax on capital gains. Thus, estimates of to and tc in equation (A-2) can not be conveniently derived by assuming tc = .5to. Extreme condi- 
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